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No Longer the Right to Remain Silent:
Cross-examining Forensic Analyst Testimony
I. INTRODUCTION
Forensic evidence helps solve crimes and is a fascination among
the general public. Popular television programs such as CSI and
NCIS expose the public to many of these investigative tools and give
them a “mythic infallibility” in the eyes of juries.1 Many refer to this
as the “CSI effect.”2 Forensic evidence can identify a suspect or even
vindicate an accused. The Innocence Project, for example, has used
DNA evidence to exonerate wrongfully convicted defendants and
save them from death row convictions and life sentences.3 Sadly,
some of these convictions originally occurred as a result of other,
faulty forensic evidence.4
A two-pronged approach helps combat faulty forensic evidence.
First, accused persons have the right to confront testimony against
them by questioning the laboratory technicians who perform the
1. Brad Reagan, CSI Myths: The Shaky Science Behind Forensics, POPULAR MECHANICS,
Aug. 2009, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/4325774.html?
page=2.
2. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect: How TV Is Driving Jury Verdicts All Across
America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 25, 2005, at 48. The CSI effect can be summed up
as basically leading jurors to expect forensic evidence in every case and assuming it to be
conclusive and accurate. See also N.J. Schweitzer & M.J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction
About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47
JURIMETRICS J. 357 (2007); Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its Effects: Media,
Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 435 (2007).
3. See
generally
The
Innocence
Project
Profiles,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2010).
4. Compare The Innocence Project Fact Sheet: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA
Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php (last visited Sept. 29,
2010) (“Unvalidated or improper forensic science played a role in approximately 50 percent of
wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA testing.”), and Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (examining the results of an empirical study on the
type of faulty evidence that led to wrongful convictions in over two hundred cases), with John
Collins & Jay Jarvis, The Wrongful Conviction of Forensic Science, CRIME LAB. REP., July 16,
2008, available at http://www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/wrongful_conviction.pdf
(contending that forensic science malpractice only accounted for 11 percent of wrongful
convictions in their survey), and Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, Who Speaks for Forensic
Science?: The Conviction and Exoneration of a Straw Man, CACNEWS: NEWS OF THE CAL.
ASS’N
OF
CRIMINALISTS,
4th
Q.
2008,
at
10,
available
at
http://www.cacnews.org/news/4thq08.pdf.
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research. Second, the forensic scientist community has engaged in
increased efforts to address problems facing the field of forensic
research and practice. The Supreme Court helped further these
efforts with its holding in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,5 and in
doing so, it also sent a message to the forensic community that
technology must continue to improve to justify the use of forensic
evidence.
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court correctly extended the
Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence and held that an accused
must have an opportunity to cross-examine forensic analysts because
this evidence is testimonial in nature.6 This Note begins in Part II by
discussing prior cases and developments related to the Confrontation
Clause that led to the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz. Part III
examines the facts, procedural history, and holding in MelendezDiaz. Part IV then analyzes the reasoning the Court relied upon to
extend the Confrontation Clause to provide defendants with an
opportunity to cross-examine laboratory technicians. Part V
examines recent critiques of forensic evidence and explains why the
Court was correct in requiring laboratory technicians to testify
regarding forensic science. Part VI provides a conclusion.
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
The Confrontation Clause requires that the accused have the
opportunity to cross-examine testimonial statements made against
him in court.7 The decision in Melendez-Diaz was the result of
several cases gradually expanding the type of evidence that qualifies
as “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes. Ohio v. Roberts,8
for instance, set forth the standard for interpreting the
Confrontation Clause—a standard that was extended in Crawford v.
Washington.9 The Court then further defined what qualified as
testimony and required cross-examination in Davis v. Washington.10
With Melendez-Diaz, the Court continued the gradual expansion of
the types of testimony that fall under the Confrontation Clause.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

1026

129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
Id. at 2531–32.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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No Longer the Right to Remain Silent
A. “Indicia of Reliability”

In Ohio v. Roberts, the defendant was charged with forgery of a
check and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to his wife.11
At the preliminary hearing, the defendant’s daughter was called to
testify.12 The defense attempted to elicit testimony from the
daughter corroborating the defendant’s version of events, but failed
to do so.13 As a result, the case proceeded to trial.14
Rather than calling the daughter at trial, the state offered the
transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony.15 The defense
objected and argued that her absence, and the fact that the
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine her testimony at
trial, was a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.16
Before the trial, the state had attempted to serve the defendant’s
daughter with multiple subpoenas left at her parents’ residence, but
it was not clear if she received them.17 By that time she had already
left the state and lost contact with her parents.18 At trial, the
prosecution made no attempt to locate the daughter, nor did they
show the court that the daughter “would be absent because of
unavailability.”19
The Court in Roberts affirmed the state court’s holding that
when a hearsay declarant is not available for cross-examination at
trial, the statement can bypass the Confrontation Clause if it “bears
adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”20 The Court further stated that
“[i]n other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”21 This
standard lasted for more than twenty years until the Court
reexamined the issue in Crawford v. Washington.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

448 U.S. 56, 58 (1980).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 66.
Id.
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B. The Confrontation Clause
The Court laid out the framework for applying the
Confrontation Clause in several recent watershed cases, including
Crawford. The Confrontation Clause is contained in the Sixth
Amendment and requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”22 In 2004, for example, the Court decided Crawford v.
Washington and further produced guidelines concerning the
admission of previously admitted hearsay statements. Crawford
reversed the rationale set forth in Roberts and held that reliability
does not adequately replace the opportunity for cross-examination
required by the Sixth Amendment.
1. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with assault and
attempted murder as a result of stabbing another man whom he
believed had attempted to rape his wife.23 The defendant’s wife was
present when the defendant stabbed the victim.24 After arresting the
defendant, the police spoke with the defendant’s wife and obtained a
statement from her regarding the events.25 At trial, the State used
this recorded statement rather than live testimony against the
defendant because the wife invoked the marital privilege.26 The state
court determined that her statements were reliable enough to be
used at trial and overcome any hearsay problems.27 The State
subsequently convicted the defendant based upon the statements of
the wife to the police.28 While the state court upheld the conviction,
the Supreme Court reversed on appeal.29
The petitioner in Crawford had urged the Court to reconsider
the reasoning of Roberts,30 arguing that the Roberts test “stray[ed]
from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”31 In
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id.
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coming to its determination, the Court spent a great deal of time
explaining the history and development of the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Scalia, a formalist, authored the opinion and explained that
the Roberts test misinterpreted the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.32 The Court in Crawford held that the
criminally accused have a right to confront and cross-examine
recorded statements of witnesses given to the police, regardless of
the court’s opinion about the testimony’s reliability.33 For
testimonial statements, “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”34
2. Davis v. Washington
The Davis Court further defined the characteristics of
“testimony” for Confrontation Clause purposes. Under Crawford,
statements of a testimonial nature cannot be used in court unless a
party has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In Davis,
the Court further delineated what constitutes a testimonial statement
and held that statements testimonial in nature or intent require
cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.35 In Davis,
the statements at issue involved comments made during the
recording of a telephone call made to 911.36 At the time of the 911
call, the caller had just been attacked and identified her boyfriend as
the assailant.37 The boyfriend was subsequently found and charged
with a felony violation of a domestic no-contact order in place at the
time.38 Although the victim was apparently available to testify, the
court admitted the recording of her 911 call over the defendant’s
objection.39 The Washington State Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court both upheld the conviction.40
The Court reasoned that to determine whether a statement
deserves Confrontation Clause protection, courts must first
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 68–69.
Id.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).
Id. at 817–18.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id.
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determine whether the statement is “testimonial.”41 The Court had
previously set forth “various formulations” in Crawford, but declined
to endorse any of them in Davis.42 Instead, the Davis Court
attempted to provide a non-exhaustive description of testimonial
versus non-testimonial statements43: “Statements are nontestimonial
when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”44 The
Court concluded that statements in 911 calls were testimonial “when
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”45 Thus, in Davis, the Court held that the statements
made to the 911 operator in this portion of the call were not
testimonial in nature, but rather were made pursuant to an ongoing
emergency.46 Accordingly, the statements did not require the type of
Confrontation Clause protections afforded testimonial statements.
III. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS
The reasoning of Crawford and Davis proved critical in
Melendez-Diaz. Melendez-Diaz appeared before the Court in 2009,
five years after Crawford and three years after Davis. The MelendezDiaz Court held that forensic affidavits are testimonial in nature and
require Confrontation Clause protections for an accused.47

41. See id. at 821–22.
42. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
43. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (explaining that the Court did not even want to
“attempt[] to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements—or even all
conceivable statements in response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial”).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 828 (“This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation
to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme Court put it,
‘evolve into testimonial statements,’ 829 N.E.2d, at 457, once that purpose has been
achieved.”). Both the Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court agreed that
although some of the statements made during the latter portion of the 911 call might have
been testimonial in nature, in this case “their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 829.
47. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531–32 (2009).

1030
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No Longer the Right to Remain Silent
A. Facts

In 2001, Boston police received a tip that a Kmart employee,
Thomas Wright, was “engage[d] in suspicious activity” while at
work.48 The suspicious employee would take breaks and leave for the
parking lot shortly after receiving phone calls at work.49 Outside, a
blue sedan would meet Wright briefly, after which Wright would
return to work.50 Police subsequently surveilled the parking lot and
observed the suspicious behavior.51 As Wright exited the car, an
officer detained and searched him.52 The officer found four clear
plastic baggies “containing a substance resembling cocaine.”53 As a
result, the officer signaled for the assisting officers to arrest the other
two occupants of the vehicle, one of whom was the defendant
Melendez-Diaz.54
All three suspects were placed in the back of the same police
55
car. During the drive to the station, the passengers fidgeted and
moved around in the back of the car.56 The police searched the
vehicle after dropping the suspects off at the station and found
nineteen other small plastic baggies containing a substance similar to
that contained in the four baggies initially discovered by the police.57
As a result, prosecutors charged Melendez-Diaz with distributing
cocaine and trafficking cocaine “in an amount between 14 and 28
grams.”58 When the prosecution entered the baggies into evidence,
“[i]t also submitted three ‘certificates of analysis.’”59 These
certificates contained the laboratory results concerning the weight
and identity of the substance contained in the baggies.60 Pursuant to
Massachusetts state law, the analysts at the state forensic laboratory
signed the certificates and had them notarized.61
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2530.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2530–31.
Id. at 2531.
Id.
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At trial, Melendez-Diaz argued that the admission of the
certificates violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause as set
forth in Crawford.62 Melendez-Diaz argued that the Confrontation
Clause “required the analysts to testify in person.”63 The trial court
overruled the objection and stated that the certificates were “prima
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the
narcotic . . . analyzed” pursuant to state law.64
B. Procedural History
The jury subsequently convicted Melendez-Diaz. On appeal,
Melendez-Diaz raised multiple issues, among them, “that admission
of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”65 Relying on
Massachusetts state law and case history, the court rejected this
claim.66 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals believed that “authors
of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment.”67 The state Supreme Judicial Court
denied review.68
C. Holding
In a 5-4 split, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts
erred in permitting the prosecution to use out-of-court certificates to
prove its case without providing the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine the lab technicians.69 The Court stated that resolving
this case “involve[d] little more than the application of our holding
in Crawford.”70
These certificates fell within the class of testimonial statements
covered by the Confrontation Clause.71 The state created the
certificates “for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

1032

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2542.
Id.
Id. at 2532.
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defendant.”72 Thus, the affidavits qualified as a “witness” and
“testimony” against Melendez-Diaz for Confrontation Clause
purposes, and Melendez-Diaz therefore had a constitutional right to
confront the witness through cross-examination.73
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Was Correct in Extending Crawford to Lab Analysts
The majority correctly and persuasively argued against the
positions adhered to by the respondents and the dissent. In striking
down these counterarguments, the majority clearly explained that
certificates and affidavits are testimonial in nature; they do not differ
from “conventional” witnesses; they do not fit under any current
hearsay exceptions; and that the dissent over-exaggerated the
potential burden on the system.
1. Certificates are testimonial and accusatory
One of the first issues the Court addressed concerned whether
certificates, or affidavits, qualify as testimonial statements. The Court
correctly held that affidavits, or certificates, “fall within the ‘core
class of testimonial statements’” that are covered by the
Confrontation Clause.74
Lab technicians prepare these affidavits for use at trial against the
defendant. Under the reasoning of Crawford, the defendant must
have an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst regarding the
affidavit. More directly, the affidavits serve an evidentiary purpose
and are not part of an ongoing emergency like the identification
made in Davis. The Melendez-Diaz Court even pointed to the actual
affidavit itself and the Massachusetts state law provision, which stated
that “the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie
evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the
analyzed substance.”75 Technicians sign and swear that the
information contained in lab reports is accurate. The very nature of
this act signifies that the technician is testifying that the information

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 2539.
Id. at 2532.
Id. (referring to White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2003)).
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contained in the certificates is true, making the affidavit testimonial
just like any other conventional testimony.
Although the respondent argued that—unlike conventional
testimony—the forensic evidence is objective and not accusatory, the
Court emphasized that statements do not have to be accusatory to
qualify as testimony subject to the Confrontation Clause.76
Conventional witnesses, for example, often testify concerning nonaccusatory information such as a description of a crime scene, their
personal observations, and other details of a crime. A lab technician’s
statements regarding evidence found at a crime scene are no different
than statements provided by a “conventional” witness.
2. Scientific report certificates are not neutral and can be prone to
distortion or manipulation
The Court correctly reasoned that laboratory report certificates
are testimonial in nature and thus require that the accused have an
opportunity to cross-examine those who prepare them. The dissent
and the respondent incorrectly argued that these affidavits are not
like conventional witness testimony and thus should not be subject
to the Confrontation Clause because the evidence they are based on
is not “prone to [the same] distortion or manipulation” as is possible
when “recounting historical events.”77 The Court correctly dismissed
this reasoning since it was the same logic that had been overturned
in Roberts. The “trustworthiness” of the testimony is no longer a
factor in determining whether testimony should be subject to the
Confrontation Clause.78 The respondent and the dissent both gave
forensic evidence too much credit. Respondents incorrectly argued
that scientific reports are not like conventional testimony because
they are “neutral” and not subject to the same errors as conventional
live witnesses.79
The dissent claimed that confrontation of these analysts by a
defendant “adds nothing.”80 Beyond the simple fact that allowing
confrontation is a constitutional mandate, failure to allow
confrontation could legitimize the mistaken belief some jurors hold
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

1034

Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2536.
See id. at 2532–33, 2536.
Id. at 2536.
Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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that all forensic evidence is equally infallible. Arguments such as this
perpetuate the myth that some in the media refer to as the “CSI
effect.”81 Instead, the majority recognized that forensic evidence is
not as objective as the respondent and dissent made it sound.82
Forensic evidence can easily be corrupted or manipulated by lab
technicians who are in a rush or who are trying to make the evidence
fit the suspect.83
The constitutional principle of confrontation provides a
defendant with an opportunity to mitigate the possible effects of
technicians making mistakes, using improper techniques, or holding
biases. Cross-examination allows a defendant to question a
technician and ensure that the evidence against him has been tested
as accurately as possible. This is not meant to imply that lab
technicians generally are corrupt or make mistakes, but it only takes
one lab technician with ulterior motives to produce a report leading
to the wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant.84 Crossexamination provides an opportunity to expose some of these
potential problems.
Additionally, public perception seems to view forensic evidence
and science as one and the same. As discussed further in Part IV,
many of these forensic techniques are not as reliable as conventional
scientific evidence (such as DNA evidence) and have not been
equally subjected to the rigors of the scientific process. Given the
errors that can occur during the gathering or testing of forensic
evidence, the Court correctly extended the reasoning of Crawford to
cover forensic evidence and lab technicians’ affidavits.
3. Confrontation extends beyond “conventional” witnesses
The dissent and the respondent incorrectly argued that the
Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against the type of
testimony “notoriously used at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh” and
not lab technicians.85 Although affidavits and lab technicians are not
“conventional” witnesses, the majority best explained the
81.
82.
83.
84.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
See infra Part V.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 44 (2009),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12589 [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
85. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
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immateriality of this distinction: “[The Raleigh] case identifies the
core of the right to confrontation, not its limits. The right to
confrontation was not invented in response to the use of the ex parte
examinations in Raleigh’s Case.”86 Permitting the presentation of
forensic evidence against a defendant without an opportunity to
cross-examine the technician who prepared the report can lead to
wrongful convictions and modern day Raleighs. The dissent listed
three ways that conventional witnesses differ from lab affidavits;
however, none of these three reasons should exempt affidavits from
cross-examination.
a. Analysts were not “near-contemporaneous.” In an apparent
attempt to resurrect the Roberts standard, the dissent argued that
contemporary witnesses are less trustworthy because they tend to be
further removed from the events than lab technicians. Conventional
witnesses “may have misperceived or misremembered,”87 whereas a
lab technician makes “a contemporaneous observation [and] need
not rely on memory; he or she instead reports the observations at the
time they are made.”88 Using reliability as a reason to exempt
testimony from cross-examination was rejected, however, by the
Court in Crawford.89
Even if a court did factor reliability into the determination, a lab
analyst does not always prepare the affidavits immediately after
performing the test. In Melendez-Diaz, for instance, the analysts
prepared the affidavits a week after they performed the tests. The
dissent failed to explain what limits differentiate “nearcontemporaneous” from events too far in the past. Regardless of
where one attempts to draw a line, reliability as to the memory of
events should not come into play when determining whether it
requires cross-examination.
Analysts make mistakes and may use controversial methods to
obtain results. Simply because the analyst makes the affidavit shortly
after using improper methods does not mean she is more reliable
than a conventional witness. The core right to confrontation allows
for the accused to cross-examine testimony against him. The accused
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy was the only Justice who switched from the majority
in Crawford to the dissent in Melendez-Diaz.

1036
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has a right to question a witness regarding bias and any other reasons
the lab results might be tainted. And while confrontation is not the
only way to challenge the results of a forensic test, it is one way
specifically provided by the Constitution.
The Court stated that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring
accurate forensic analysis.”90 An honest analyst has nothing to fear in
court and will likely testify truthfully regarding her methods and
results because she has nothing to hide. However, a dishonest analyst
may reconsider her fraudulent analysis. Requiring lab technicians to
testify may reduce the number of fraudulent cases. An analyst who
knows she will be confronted with the results and be prosecuted for
perjury may likely think twice before fabricating results.
Moreover, confrontation can protect against fraudulent as well as
incompetent analysis. Requiring an analyst to testify and qualify as an
expert witness can help “weed out” some of the improper forensic
evidence.91 One study showed that invalid forensic testimony
contributed to wrongful criminal convictions in as many as 60
percent of the cases.92 The Court also quoted Professor Pamela
Metzger who stated that the “legal community now concedes, with
varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces erroneous
convictions based on discredited forensics.”93
Consensus within the legal field and among the public continues
to be elusive, but many recognize that all forensic evidence is not
created equal. Subjectivity and bias can come into play. In light of
these considerations, and as the Court recognized, it is not sound to
base decisions about the right to confront analysts on the basis that
their statements may be made in closer temporal proximity to the
actual observation than those of ordinary witnesses.
b. Analysts “observe neither the crime nor any human action
related to it.” The dissent argued an analyst differs from a
conventional witness because “[o]ften, the analyst does not know
the defendant’s identity” nor does she have any knowledge of the

90. Id. at 2536 (majority opinion).
91. See id. at 2537.
92. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2009).
93. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 491 (2006)).
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defendant’s guilt.94 However, because of the subjectivity involved in
some of the forensic techniques, analysts may suppress or manipulate
evidence to alleviate the pressures put on them by investigative
detectives.95 A British researcher, for example, has performed studies
showing that “fingerprint examiners can be influenced by what else
they know about a case.”96 Some of his experiments even resulted in
“the same examiner . . . com[ing] to different conclusions about the
same fingerprint, if the context is changed over time.”97 Evidence
susceptible to this degree of subjectivity should be subject to crossexamination by the accused.
Moreover, the dissent did not adequately expound upon this
concept of analysts being adequately removed in time. Simply
because a witness at trial did not observe the crime, for instance,
does not make him an unconventional witness. Expert witnesses have
long been used at trial, and the Court has never exempted expert
witnesses from Confrontation Clause requirements merely because
they did not “observe . . . the crime nor any human action related to
it.”98 This should not, therefore, be a reason to exempt lab analysts.
c. Conventional witnesses respond to interrogation. Lastly, Justice
Kennedy apparently assumed that lab affidavits are objective and
non-adversarial. Justice Kennedy offered the distinction that unlike
lab technicians, the Constitution only requires that an accused be
permitted to confront conventional witnesses and their out-of-court
statements that are adversarial to the accused.99 This argument
ignored the subjectivity that comes with some forensic analysis
techniques.100
Throughout his dissent, Justice Kennedy appears to have based
his analysis on the faulty assumption that all forensic evidence has
passed the rigors of scientific analysis and is therefore not subject to
significant error. But the inherent nature of some forensic analysis
requires the analyst to draw her own conclusions rather than merely

94. Id. at 2553 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. See NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 44–48.
96. Henry Fountain, Plugging Holes in the Science of Forensics, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2009, at D1.
97. Id.
98. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2552 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. See infra Part V.
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printing out the results of a chemical analysis done by a computer.
Faulty forensic evidence has contributed to too many wrongful
convictions to assume that it is scientific, objective, and nonadversarial.101
Forensic evidence may be volunteered, but volunteered
statements can be deemed testimonial—as those provided to the
police in Davis were.102 Although police may have questioned the
witness, the accused still has a right to confront anyone making an
accusation against him in court, regardless of whether the witness’s
statements came voluntarily or under subpoena. The Court stated
that these prior statements concerned “establishing the facts of a past
crime” and clearly required confrontation protection.103 Lab analysts
perform tests in order to establish facts of past crimes as well, and the
accused should receive the same confrontational opportunities for
this type of evidence.
4. Lab affidavits do not fit under the business, official, or public records
exception
The dissent attempted to compare lab result affidavits to other
types of documents that fit under the business or public records
hearsay exceptions. However, this line of reasoning fails when one
considers that those exceptions are meant to allow the introduction
of documents that were primarily prepared for non-court use. Lab
technicians prepare affidavits for the primary purpose of use as
testimony against a defendant at trial. Allowing affidavits to come in
under one of these exceptions again takes a detour around the
constitutional right of confrontation.
The dissent incorrectly argued that the Framers did not intend to
require confrontation for these unconventional witnesses. Although
lab analysts did not exist at the time, the dissent stated that forensic
lab analysts are comparable to copyists.104 The Court has long
allowed parties to introduce into evidence copies of official
documents without requiring the copyist to testify. However, in
comparison to copyists who only make manual facsimiles of their
product, the work of a lab analyst introduces far more subjectivity. In

101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra note 4.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006).
Id.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2552–53 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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other words, forensic evidence analysis requires analysts to make
logical educated guesses.
As this Note further discusses in Part IV, forensic analysis
requires much more subjective input than many would at first
imagine. Much like many juries, the dissent appears to have fallen
victim to the “CSI effect.”105
5. Subpoena analyst under Compulsory Process Clause or state statute
The Compulsory Process Clause and Confrontation Clause serve
two different purposes in dictating which witnesses a defendant may
call. The Confrontation Clause provides a defendant with the
opportunity to confront witnesses “against” him.106 Conversely, the
Compulsory Process Clause permits a defendant to call witnesses “in
his favor.”107 The majority opinion clearly stated that all witnesses fit
within one of these two categories. The majority rejected the
attempt by the dissent to carve out a third category of witnesses
helpful to the prosecution, but not qualifying as witnesses “against”
the accused.108 The dissent stated that defendants can already
subpoena analysts to testify under the Compulsory Process Clause.
The majority rejected this argument by stating that it “is no
substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation
Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the
witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear.”109
6. Burden on the system
a. Burden is no reason to ignore a defendant’s constitutional
protection. The Constitution is not an efficiency guide that values
efficiency over the rights of individuals. Although some situations
may call for a suspension of some constitutional rights—such as a
suspension of habeas corpus, searches without a warrant, or
restrictions on free speech—the burden of making a lab technician
appear in court does not justify denying a criminal defendant the
constitutional right to confront the technician’s testimony against
him.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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See supra note 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2533–34.
Id. at 2540.
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b. Majority doubts implications expressed by respondent and dissent.
Although the dissent laid out dire warnings concerning the
floodgates Melendez-Diaz may open, some states have already
instituted similar confrontation requirements without crippling their
justice systems. Specifically, nine states have required technicians to
testify as a result of Crawford.110 Mississippi began requiring lab
technicians to testify in order to avoid Confrontation Clause
violations in 1985 as a result of a Mississippi Supreme Court
decision.111 The court stated that “allow[ing], without the consent of
the defendant, this essential element to be proven solely by a
certificate of the analyst impermissibly lessens the constitutionally
required burden which is on the state.”112
The Melendez-Diaz dissent believed that although some states
have provided the accused with a right to confrontation, the full
effects of this practice have not yet fully affected the system. “These
States have not yet been subject to the widespread, adverse results of
the formalism the Court mandates today.”113 Justice Kennedy did
not explain the portents that apparently provided this long term
foreseeability.
In response to the argument that the Melendez-Diaz requirement
would overwhelm judicial systems, subsequent observers have
detailed that some states already require testimony by lab
technicians.114 In describing these states, the petitioner in Briscoe v.
Virginia stated that states requiring lab technician testimony have
“shoulder[ed] their burden . . . . [T]hese jurisdictions still have
functioning criminal justice systems: drug cases are prosecuted, guilty
pleas are entered, and trials at which forensic analysts testify in
person for the prosecution are had.”115
If courts continue to permit unconventional evidence in criminal
cases, the Court should not permit this unconventional testimony to
skirt the rights guaranteed in the Constitution merely because it will

110. See id. at 2541 n.11.
111. See Barnette v. State, 481 So. 2d 788 (Miss. 1985).
112. Id. at 791.
113. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2558 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
114. See infra Part V.D.
115. Brief for Pub. Defender Serv. for D.C. and the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2009) (No. 0711191).

1041

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/12/2010 5:49:10 PM

2010

cost the state more to support its evidence. The dissent believed the
costs imposed by requiring technicians to testify would lead to the
guilty going free and an abuse of “Melendez-Diaz objections” by
zealous defense attorneys. However, nothing comes free. These same
objections could be raised against other types of constitutional
protections, such as jury trials. As long as courts allow analysts to
present subjective forensic evidence testimony, the Court should
continue to allow a defendant to cross-examine the preparer of the
testimony.
c. Resolving which laboratory technician testifies. The dissent
provided numerous scenarios involving multiple analysts involved in
one forensic test and considered which analyst should testify.116
These are legitimate concerns that the Court should address and for
which it should provide guidelines. However, the fact that such
issues remain unclear should not prevent application of the principle.
State courts have operated in this void by imposing different
rules concerning which analyst must testify to satisfy the Sixth
Amendment. California courts, for example, have generally held that
testimony by a technician other than the one who prepared the
report violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.117 On the
other hand, Mississippi does not require the technician who
performed the tests to testify, but does require someone from the lab
to do so.118 The Court did not address this in Melendez-Diaz and
again missed the opportunity to provide a procedure for analyst
testimony in Briscoe v. Virginia.119
The dissent also mentioned chain of custody and authentication
problems involved with requiring analyst testimony. The
authentication argument contends that it would require the copyist

116. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544–45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., People v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (Sixth
Amendment violation where a pathologist testified in reliance on an autopsy report that he
himself did not create); People v. Carruth, 2009 WL 2564832 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2009)
(unpublished) (Sixth Amendment violation where a forensic toxicologist testified about
another forensic toxicologist’s curriculum vitae and about the nature of the lab report the
other toxicologist generated); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (no Sixth Amendment violation where the director of the lab testified based on
toxicology reports prepared by other analysts).
118. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2558 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy believes
that Mississippi’s practice possibly may not reconcile with the Melendez-Diaz holding.
119. See infra Part V.D.
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to testify. Again the dissent improperly compared a copyist to an
analyst. Authentication should not be an issue when one realizes the
differences between an analyst who produces a document containing
subjective findings for court and someone making a facsimile of the
report.
The dissent also argued that the decision by the majority could
be extended to require each person in the chain of custody to testify,
which has never been the case for police officers. Although it remains
unclear which technician should testify when multiple technicians
take part in the testing, a reductio ad absurdum argument should not
refute an argument yet to be fully defined.
The decision in Melendez-Diaz may create some additional
burdens on laboratory technicians, but it ensures that the
government meets its constitutionally required burden. Inefficiency
should not excuse the State from providing defendants with the
opportunity to confront witnesses against them. The infamous trial
of Sir Walter Raleigh influenced many jurisdictions throughout the
world. The justice system must avoid denying defendants the right to
confront the witnesses against them in the same manner in which the
Crown denied the right to Sir Walter Raleigh.
V. THE NEW WITNESS: FORENSIC SCIENCE
The Melendez-Diaz majority also correctly relied on the findings
of the National Academy of Sciences’ (“NAS”) Report throughout
its opinion. The findings of the committee revealed a system in need
of overhaul. In order to combat forensic mistakes, the Court
reasoned that “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate
forensic analysis.”120
Forensic evidence can easily turn a trial against or in favor of a
defendant. Presenting forensic reports alone without an expert can
incorrectly lead a layperson on the jury to assume its truthfulness.
The NAS Report stated that “[t]he fact is that many forensic
tests . . . have never been exposed to stringent scientific scrutiny.”121
This does not mean forensic evidence should be prohibited, nor does
it imply that forensic evidence is inherently faulty. Instead, this fact
merely highlights that the Court’s decision to require a laboratory
technician to testify is justified considering the possibility of faulty
120. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
121. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 42.
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evidence. Some techniques used to evaluate forensic evidence have
not been as thoroughly tested as others—a fact that can lead to bias,
faulty evidence, and wrongful convictions.122
A. National Academy of Sciences Report
In November 2005, Congress authorized “the National
Academy of Sciences [“NAS”] to conduct a study on forensic
science, as described in the Senate report.”123 The Senate Report
instructed the committee to research and report on several areas of
forensic science.124 In the fall of 2006, the NAS established a
committee composed of “members of the forensic science
community, members of the legal community, and a diverse group
of scientists.”125
The Senate did not ask the Academy to investigate DNA
evidence because DNA has already passed scientific scrutiny and
analysis.126 Other forms of forensic evidence, however, have not
undergone the same rigorous scientific scrutiny as DNA,127 even
though they can have a similar impact in a criminal trial. Thus, the
report focused on non-DNA forensic evidence and the crime
laboratories performing the analysis.
The report revealed that crime laboratories and the methods
used for forensic evidence have “serious problems.”128 The
consistency of the testimony and evidence presented to the members
of the committee “surprised” them.129 To address these problems,
the committee has called for a new federal entity to deal with the
problems highlighted in the report and institute the
recommendations made therein.130
The proposed “National Institute of Forensic Science” would
address many of the problem areas that existing federal agencies are
not adequately equipped to handle.131 The report calls for the new

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

1044

See id. at 4, 37.
H.R. REP. NO. 109-272, at 121 (2005) (Conf. Rep.).
See S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005).
NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 2.
See S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005).
See NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 8.
Id. at xx.
Id.
Id. at 18–19.
Id.
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entity to be rooted in science and to develop strong ties to forensic
labs and organizations throughout the country.132 The agency would
be separate from any law enforcement agencies and would be willing
to push for improvements.133
The report received a mixed response from the forensic
community, but some welcomed the critique. Lawrence Kobilinsky,
chairman of the department of sciences at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice in New York, stated that “the report was ‘basically
saying what many of us have been saying for a long time . . . [that]
[t]here are a lot of areas in forensics that need improvement.’”134
Elaine Pagliaro, a Connecticut State Police analyst, called the recent
scrutiny “good.”135 “‘It’s important for the public to have a realistic
expectation of what the science can do.’”136
B. Problems with Forensic Science
The Report refers to the field of forensic evidence as a
“fragmented system”137 with “serious problems”138 and
“deficiencies.”139 The committee made thirteen recommendations
for improvement.140 The committee argued that although Congress
and a new National Institute will not likely fix all deficiencies within
the current system, “truly meaningful advances will not come
without significant concomitant leadership from the federal
government.”141
Although forensic evidence has been used to identify the guilty,
it has also led to the conviction of the innocent.142 Some of these
wrongful convictions resulted from forensic methods that have
developed outside the rigors of the scientific method. The report
states that “[a]lthough research has been done in some disciplines,

132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Fountain, supra note 96.
135. Reagan, supra note 1.
136. Id.
137. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 14.
138. Id. at xx.
139. Id. at 18.
140. See id. at 19–33.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate
Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007).
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there is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies
establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic
methods.”143
Forensic science embodies a range of analytical disciplines that
exhibit “wide variability . . . with regard to techniques,
methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors,
research, general acceptability, and published material.”144
Unfortunately, “no forensic method other than nuclear DNA
analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently and with a high degree of certainty” match a sample to a
source.145 Despite these problems, Justice Kennedy began his dissent
by stating that “[t]he Court sweeps away an accepted rule governing
the admission of scientific evidence.”146 However, Justice Kennedy
ignored the subjectivity of some forms of forensic evidence and failed
to recognize that it is not all infallible and equal.
1. Subjective, expert-based evidence: fingerprints, ballistics,
screwdrivers, and more
Forensic evidence consists of laboratory based evidence and
evidence based on “expert interpretation of observed patterns.”147
Lab based evidence such as toxicology, DNA, and drug analysis,
comes as a result of processes that have undergone the rigors of the
scientific process. The NAS noticed a “sharp distinction[]” between
chemists, biochemists, medical doctors, and the other forensic
“technicians who lend support to forensic science enterprises.”148
Forensic evidence based on expert interpretation and observed
patterns provides analysts with much more subjectivity and an
increased possibility of error and bias.
Forensic evidence comes in many shapes and forms—from
fingerprint and bite mark analysis, to ballistic patterns on spent shell
casings. Although DNA is the most accurate and objective of
forensic evidence,149 it only makes up ten percent of laboratory case
143. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 8.
144. Id. at 6–7.
145. Id. at 87.
146. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
147. NAS REPORT, supra note 84, at 7.
148. Id.
149. See id.
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work150 and can still find itself subject to error and mistakes.151 The
remaining forensic evidence used against defendants tends to consist
of other more subjective evidence interpreted by analysts.152
Fingerprint evidence has led to some embarrassing public
misidentifications. One of the most famous of these came during the
investigation into the Madrid, Spain train bombings in 2004.153 A
fingerprint found on a plastic bag at the scene implicated an Oregon
lawyer named Brandon Mayfield. His fingerprint was in the FBI
database due to his prior military service. This fingerprint match led
to Mayfield’s arrest and the FBI’s subsequent embarrassment due to
the impossibility of Mayfield’s involvement.154
Fingerprint identification has recently come under fire from legal
experts.155 Juries sometimes do not understand the impreciseness of
fingerprinting technology because “fingerprint examiners typically
testify in the language of absolute certainty.”156 However, “certain
confidence in identification [is] unjustified.”157 One scholar believes
that in order to pass legal scrutiny as an expert witness, “fingerprint
identification experts should exhibit a greater degree of
epistemological humility.”158 In one study, when six fingerprint
examiners studied the same print twice, only two of the six reached
the same conclusion both times.159
Some forensic science methods allow human error to easily enter
into play. Human bias can lead to a technician trying to make the
evidence fit his or her preconceived suspects rather than letting the
evidence lead to the proper suspect. In an investigation resulting
from the Mayfield case, for example, a panel of experts found that
the involved “culture discouraged fingerprint examiners from
disagreeing with their superiors” and was prone to insufficient

150. Id. at 41.
151. See, e.g., id. at 132.
152. See id. at 7, 38.
153. David Stout, Report Faults F.B.I.’s Fingerprint Scrutiny in Arrest of Lawyer, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A18.
154. Id.
155. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Reagan, supra note 1.
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scrutiny.160 Although bias on the part of investigators may be wellintentioned, it may also lead to incorrect results. For example,
researchers have noted that bias on the part of an investigator
involved with suspect identification can lead to faulty identifications
on the part of witnesses.161 Bias and error can also creep into other
areas of forensic evidence.
Other methods often seen on CSI: Miami and viewed as
authoritative by the public—such as ballistic identification, dental
marks, and arson forensics—face the same limitations as fingerprints.
As technology evolves, so do the data and evidence investigators can
gather and use against defendants. Some are even trying, for
example, to determine how to identify a screwdriver used in prying
open a door or window.162 While the proponents of such evidence
have excellent intentions and crave accuracy, these methods have
often not been subjected to the rigors of the scientific process. Even
when they have been, they often nevertheless lack the accuracy of
DNA, or even that of fingerprints. When such evidence is used in
court, the accused must always have an opportunity to cross-examine
the analyst submitting it in order to help jurors realize the limits of
such evidence.
2. Wrongful convictions
Wrongful convictions will continue to exist despite radical
improvements regarding forensic science. After all, not all
convictions are based on forensic evidence. Forensic evidence has
been responsible for the exculpation of convicts as well as the
conviction of the innocent.163
Blackstone said, “Better that ten guilty persons escape than that
one innocent suffer.”164 “But why ten”165 asked Professor Volokh, in
examining the number posited by various courts and legal jurists
throughout the centuries. Regardless of the number of guilty that
must go free in order to protect the innocent, society has a moral
160. Stout, supra note 153.
161. The
Innocence
Project,
Eyewitness
Misidentification,
http://
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Sept.
29, 2010) (calling eyewitness misidentification the “greatest cause of wrongful convictions”).
162. Fountain, supra note 96.
163. See supra note 4.
164. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
165. See Alexander Volokh, Aside, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1997).
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responsibility to make sure it does everything within its power to
make sure this number is as low as possible. The United States must
do everything within its power to ensure that evidentiary standards
provide the accused with an adequate opportunity to confront the
evidence against him. Otherwise, more innocent will suffer than
necessary.
Many go to their graves professing their innocence, and the
Innocence Project has helped free some convicts throughout the past
few decades.166 With the rise in the number of people exonerated by
DNA, one must wonder how many convicts are still wrongfully
imprisoned. Although researchers debate the numbers of wrongfully
convicted by forensic evidence,167 a few recent news events have
brought the issue to the public eye.
Popular Mechanics and others in the media are starting to
publicize the limits of forensic science and the human cost of it. In a
recent issue of its magazine, Popular Mechanics profiled the
conviction of Roy Brown.168 A New York jury convicted Brown
based on bite marks found on the victim’s body that a forensic
dentist identified as “entirely consistent” with Brown’s. Brown was
later set free based on DNA evidence linking another suspect to the
crime.169 Mistakes such as this are unfortunately common.
In combination with the recently published NAS Report, a
number of popular non-legal periodicals have started examining the
reliability of forensic science and its role in death row cases.170 It
appears that Texas recently executed a death row inmate who was
actually innocent, yet condemned by faulty forensic evidence.171
Although probably not the first wrongful execution, hopefully it will
be the last as technology improves and as the accused receive more
opportunities to cross-examine the evidence and its proponents
against them.
166. The Innocence Project Fact Sheet: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php.
167. Supra note 4.
168. Reagan, supra note 1.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Did Texas Kill an Innocent Man?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/10/did_texas_kill_an_innoce
nt_man.cfm; Reagan, supra note 1.
171. See Did Texas Kill an Innocent Man?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/10/did_texas_kill_an_innoce
nt_man.cfm.
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C. Solutions
Going forward, both the Court and the forensic community
must do its part to mitigate wrongful convictions and faulty science.
The Court has done its part by requiring the prosecution to produce
laboratory technicians and providing the defense with a right to
confront these analysts. The scientific community must now
implement the recommendations made by the NAS. In order to
preserve the benefits that forensic evidence provides to investigators
and mitigate the effects of faulty forensics, the NAS has
recommended mandatory standardization, certification, and
accreditation of laboratory analysts.172 Due to the broad range of
forensic science disciplines, the NAS did not fully analyze each
individual forensic area for its congressional report.
Determining the accuracy of forensic evidence requires a national
change of procedure. One problem facing the field is that the broad
range of forensic techniques makes it difficult for the forensic
community to set clear standards across the board. Forensic
techniques also differ in terms of the protocols and research available
in each particular area. However, these circumstances do not mean
the forensic community cannot define minimum standards and
protocols.
In addition to minimum standards and protocols for each
forensic discipline, the NAS identified a crucial need for courts and
forensic analysts to identify the exact question the forensic evidence
can address.173 For example, hair samples often cannot identify a
specific individual, but it can likely identify specific traits.174 The NAS
found that many forensic areas lacked established “limits and
measures of performance” that would prevent incorrect inferences
based on the evidence and technique.175 Identifying and establishing
national standards, protocols, and limits of forensic evidence could
lead to a reduction of faulty forensic evidence appearing in courts
across the country.
The establishment of a national board to oversee the standards
used in expert-based evidence would provide another level of
accountability
beyond
mere
cross-examination.
Requiring
172.
173.
174.
175.
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Id.
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certification of forensic technicians could help limit the impact and
employment of faulty and unreliable forensic techniques in litigation
and criminal cases. By providing defendants with the right to crossexamine technicians, hopefully jurors will realize that forensic
evidence is not infallible. Permitting the prosecution to introduce
forensic evidence affidavits without accompanying expert testimony
undoubtedly reinforces the myth of the “CSI effect” in the minds of
jurors.
D. The Future of the Confrontation Clause after Melendez-Diaz
Justice Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice Souter and the
granting of certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia provided the Court with
an opportunity to further outline requirements for forensic witnesses
or even reconsider its decision in Melendez-Diaz. The majority in
Melendez-Diaz consisted of Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg. Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Alito made up the dissent. Accordingly, with Justice
Sotomayor’s replacement of Justice Souter, her vote was almost
certain to be the deciding vote in Briscoe.
The Court announced the decision in Melendez-Diaz on June
25, 2009. A few days later, on June 29, 2009, the Court granted
certiorari to Briscoe,176 a case presenting a nearly identical issue to
Melendez-Diaz.177 Although granting certiorari to Briscoe surprised
some Court observers, some thought the Court wanted to hear
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion on the issue. 178 However, many others
believed the Court would grant cert, vacate, and remand for further
consideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.179 During Justice
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing, Minnesota Senator and former
prosecutor Amy Klobuchar expressed her disagreement with the
outcome of Melendez-Diaz and asked Justice Sotomayor for her
176. See Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009).
177. Compare Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009)
(“whether those affidavits are ‘testimonial,’ rendering the affiants ‘witnesses’ subject to the
defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment”), with Briscoe, 129 S. Ct.
2858 (asking the Court to determine whether the prosecution violates the Confrontation
Clause by making laboratory technicians available to testify at the request of defense and
presenting certificates without the testimony of the technicians).
178. See
generally
Posting
of
Lyle
Denniston
to
SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/new-lab-report-case-granted (June 29, 2009, 13:51 EST).
179. See, e.g., G . . . VR in Briscoe, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2010/01/
g-vr-in-briscoe.html (Jan. 25, 2010, 16:51 EST).
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thoughts on the case.180 Justice Sotomayor did little to tip her hand
about how she would have decided the case, but she did state that
“it’s difficult proving cases as it is.”181 While noting that “calling
more witnesses adds some burdens to the process,” Justice
Sotomayor followed up by saying that “problems . . . can’t compel a
result.”182
Although the majority in Melendez-Diaz took on many of the
counterarguments raised by the dissent, the Court left many
procedural concerns unaddressed, including which technician
testifies when multiple analysts are involved in an investigation, or
how to mitigate possible floodgates opened by the decision. Rather
than using Briscoe as an opportunity to address these issues or even
cut back on the holding of Melendez-Diaz, however, the Court
declined to do so. On January 25, 2010, the Court issued a per
curium opinion vacating the Virginia Supreme Court ruling and
remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with
Melendez-Diaz.183 Why the Court initially granted certiorari remains
unclear, but it is now evident that the Court reaffirmed MelendezDiaz as good law. The Court explained why forensic analysts must
testify, but left the procedural details concerning how to the lower
courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
A two-pronged effort by the courts and the forensic community
to combat the introduction of faulty evidence will lead to more
accurate forensic evidence and fewer wrongful convictions. This
Note is not proposing suppression of forensic evidence, rather its
intent is to highlight why the Melendez-Diaz Court correctly held
that the Confrontation Clause requires laboratory technicians to
testify in court.
Justice Kennedy incorrectly stereotyped forensic evidence and
the technicians who obtain the results as objective with little to no
influence on the results. The NAS Report explains why this view is
incorrect and suffers from the same “CSI effect” seen among the
180. See Sen. Klobuchar Questions Judge Sotomayor at Supreme Court Nomination
Hearings, WASH. POST, July 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071501739.html.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam).
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general public. Should the Court have found that confrontation of
lab analysts was not required by the Constitution, the “CSI effect”
would have continued to deleteriously affect juries, and the idea that
forensic evidence is infallible would have been legitimized. However,
the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz appears to indicate that
society is on the right track to exposing and avoiding the potential
pitfalls when relying on forensic science.
As forensic evidence analysis improves so will its accuracy.
Lawrence Kobilinsky, chairman of the department of sciences at John
Jay College of Criminal Justice, described forensic science best: “It’s
not junk science. But that doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be
improved.”184 The field of forensic science continues to improve its
reliability and accuracy. As this happens, it is important that the
accused have a chance to question the witnesses in court because it
“is one means of assuring accurate forensic analysis.”185
Casey Unwin

184. Fountain, supra note 96.
185. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009).
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